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Turkish and European Union Interests in a Cyprus Settlement
1 
CHRISTOPHER BREWIN 
University of Keele, UK 
 
Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) is, like the alternative Islamic and Turanian 
options, more about permanent friendships than permanent interests. Defining  European 
interests might now be seen in a historical development from national to milieu interests. 
Turkish interests in a Cyprus settlement are discussed in terms of the impact on the integrity 
of the Turkish state and economic interests. European interests are in creating peace in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and in taking seriously its new self-definition as a multicultural and 
security actor protecting minorities and human rights. A possible way forward from the 
present impasse on the island is for an international conference to define a new framework 
settlement, modelled on the Israeli-Palestine agreement on Jerusalem in 1995. 
 
 
   
I.   Introduction 
 
On the principle that countries do not have permanent friends, but only permanent interests, 
Turkish diplomacy had done a remarkably effective job. (Hale 2000: 102) 
 
As for individuals, the maxim that states have permanent interests means different things 
in different contexts.  Hale invokes it here in the context of defending the Turkish 
Republic’s policy of neutrality in the Second World War until Turkey allied with the 
United Nations in February 1945.  But the book from which the quotation is taken – on 
Turkish policy from 1770 to 2000 – can also be read as an account of how the end of the 
Ottoman Empire and the construction of a modern republic carried with the change of 
unit a very different understanding of Turkish interests. Secondly, as the international 
context changes, so do interests.  
The Cyprus story illustrates the well-understood change from the imperial concept to 
that of the nation-state, and the less secure change in Europe from a framework of 
national interests to what might tentatively be called a European milieu interest.  At a 
general level, it is indisputable that the Cyprus question had a different meaning when the 
interests at stake were those of empires – Ottoman, Russian, Austrian, British, French and 
German. The Sultan’s lease of Cyprus to the British Empire had nothing to do with 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Kemal Kirisçi for inviting me to speak at his conference on “ Turkey and Cyprus”  in 
Boğaziçi University in April 2002, and to Heinz Kramer for copies of some of his unpublished work.   
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Cypriot self-determination. As late as 1958 the British decision to deploy 40,000 troops 
in Cyprus, and to employ disproportionate numbers of Turkish Cypriots as policemen, 
were intended to crush a nationalist liberation movement in a colony.   
After 1960, British actions, in common with other European countries, were based on 
a narrowly defined concept of national interest. This transition was blurred by the 
continued presence of British soldiers on the sovereign bases, an imperial anachronism, 
and in the United Nations peacekeeping force.  However, the major determinants of UK 
policy are no longer British imperial interests, but rather the protection of British citizens, 
British commercial interests and Britain’s relationship with the USA.   In the event of war 
over Cyprus, the British will evacuate their nationals – tourists, residents and soldiers.  In 
1974 they did not risk British lives in protecting the Cyprus constitution from either 
Greek or Turkish attack; and in the previous decade had allowed the Greek Cypriot 
majority and Turkish Cypriot minority to accelerate the trend away from mixed villages. 
Britain chose to interpret its Guarantor status as a source of rights, rather than duties 
(James 1998: 16). Today the 40,000 non-Cypriot troops presently in Cyprus are there for 
reasons of Greek and Turkish and British national interests.   
The claim that since the end of the Cold War the framework of relations among 
European nation-states has been transformed from one solely based on national interests 
to one that is also based on a common milieu interest is more contentious.  It makes more 
sense to the countries of Western Europe, where no country expects war with its 
neighbours, than in the Eastern Mediterranean where every country prepares for war with 
all its neighbours.  The milieu concept is that the fifteen nation states constituting the 
European Union (EU) have become an effective guarantor of the borders, democratic 
regimes and minority rights of European states.  The applicants for EU membership in 
Eastern Europe have adapted to West European norms in trade, pluralist political parties 
and human rights for the same benefits that the ex-fascist states of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal have already received from membership. The reunified Germany has subsumed 
the Deutsche Mark in the Euro.  Instead of dominating  an anarchic Eastern Europe, 
Germany has been the strongest advocate of an enlarged and institutionalised Europe, 
deliberately prioritising milieu goals. Greece, in the Kosovo and Macedonian conflicts, 
similarly subordinated its national identification with Serbia and Russia to a common  
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European policy. Since the disasters in Srebrenica and Rwanda, European statesmen have 
recognized that, if there is to be a multicultural Europe worthy of the name, they have a 
duty to risk their soldiers in conflicts where t heir national interests are not involved. 
Turkey has offered 5,000 troops for an EU Rapid Reaction Force for humanitarian 
operations where Washington is unwilling to commit its troops.  The European Union, 
for these various reasons, has thus become a more important regional security actor than 
NATO (Wæver 2000: 262).  This is not to deny that nationalism since 1989 has been 
both powerful and unpredictable, and that it is possible to interpret what I have called a 
duty as no more than enlightened national interest. 
Two further introductory points are relevant. This article is written from the 
perspective that Turkish membership would benefit the EU and Turkey. The European 
Union is precisely about having permanent friends, each bound by the principle of 
solidarity to help other member states in difficulties, whether or not those difficulties are 
of their own making.  European solidarity is much more far-reaching than the 
membership of the NATO alliance to which Turkey has been committed since 1952. It is 
also  relevant that two of Turkey’s alternatives to the European Union also envisage 
permanent friends.  Mr Erbakan was interested in promoting the solidarity of the 
Organization of Islamic countries, and Mr Korkmaz Haktanır’s speech in Northern 
Cyprus about a p ossible Union of Turkic republics envisages future solidarity among 
Turkic-speaking peoples (Brewin 2002: 10). 
Secondly, national interests are defined by the government of the day. Hitler’s 
understanding of German national interest differed markedly both from that of Konrad 
Adenauer in post-war West Germany and Walther Ulbricht in East Germany.  The 
election of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Germany put Turkey’s candidature on the EU 
agenda in place of the preference for a stable framework short of membership preferred 
by the Christian Democrat and Social Democrat Chancellors who preceded him in Bonn.  
In the September 2002 election in Germany, the Social Democrats are unlikely to make 
an issue of Mr Stoiber’s opposition to Turkey’s candidature.  At the time of writing, July 
2002, Turkey is expected to go to the polls in November, to the dismay of all the parties 
in the government coalition.  If İsmail Cem’s new party and Tayyip Erdoğan’s party do 
well, this may yet improve Turkey’s membership prospects.  
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It is time to look more closely at the separate and common interests of Turkey and the 
European Union in a settlement of the conflict in Cyprus between two mutually 
suspicious communities/societies who have been physically separated for two 
generations. 
 
II.   Turkish interests in a Cyprus settlement 
 
When we consider 
  The importancy of Cyprus to the Turk,  
  And let ourselves again but understand,  
  That as it more concerns the Turk than Rhodes 
So may he with more facile question bear it; 
Shakespeare, Othello 
 
On 29 March 2002, Mesut Yilmaz, Turkey’s deputy Prime Minister in charge of relations 
with the European Union told the Turkish Daily News that “ [Turkish] membership of the 
EU cannot be linked to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, a position which has been 
put on record in the relevant EU documents” .  Heinz Kramer has documented Turkey’s 
long-standing refusal officially to discuss a Cyprus settlement with the European Union 
(Kramer 2002).  For example, in April 1987 Mesut Yilmaz as foreign minister refused to 
attend the meeting of the Turkey-EEC Association Council immediately following the 
Turkish application for membership.  His problem was that, at Greek instigation, the 
introductory remarks of the German EC Presidency referred to the Cyprus problem as 
affecting European relations with Turkey.  Having made the point that Cyprus should not 
be a topic on the formal agenda, Mr Yilmaz then discussed the problem at dinner.  In 
March 1995, the EU foreign ministers at a General Affairs Council overcame the Greek 
veto on the final stages of the Customs Union with Turkey. At the dinner following the 
simultaneous but separate meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, the Turkish 
foreign minister, Murat Karayalçin, refused publicly to accept that a package deal had 
been made.  Instead he sought to counter Turkish Cypriot and Turkish charges that he 
was betraying Turkish interests by finalising a Customs Union with the EU, knowing that 
Greece had obtained from its fellow-members a date for opening the EU accession 
process with Cyprus. As a non-member, Mr Karayalçin had not been a party to this  
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agreement. However, he made it clear that Turkey, in the absence of a Cyprus settlement, 
would match the steps integrating Southern Cyprus with the EU by integrating  Northern 
Cyprus with Turkey (Brewin 2000: ch. 1).  Turkey’s official policy of refusing to discuss 
Cyprus with the EU was also a factor in its own accession process.  In December 1999, 
Mr Bülent Ecevit did not accept the Helsinki summit offer of candidacy status until a 
letter from the EU Presidency had been received in Ankara. This letter is not in the public 
domain, but it can be inferred that the Presidency promised that the Cyprus issue would 
only be discussed behind closed doors in the first stage of the Accession Partnership. 
Prime Minister Ecevit told the Anatolian Agency on 20 July 2001 that the EU 
representatives  “ saw how sensitive we were about some foreign issues and national 
matters… they flew to Ankara by a private plane at midnight and said words which meant 
they would not make us uneasy about these issues” . The Commission did not include 
progress in Cyprus among the short-term aims for the Accession Partnership with 
Turkey. When the Council inserted this demand, Ankara announced that it might have to 
re-assess its relations, a coded threat of withdrawal from the accession process (Brewin 
2002: 23).  Given that Ankara has every reason to think that Greece would not be alone in 
refusing to contemplate Turkish EU membership unless there is a settlement of  the 
Cyprus dispute, it is plain that Turkish diplomats and public opinion hold that Turkey’s 
national interests are at stake.  In November 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
held its tenth secret session devoted to the Cyprus issue.  All the political parties agreed a 
national pact on Cyprus categorizing it as a national issue involving  “ Turkey’s vital 
national and strategic interests”  (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000).  The claim that EU 
membership generally, and the Cyprus issue particularly, puts at risk the integrity of the 
Turkish state is discussed in the next section, followed by a short review of economic 
interests at stake.  
 
Integrity of the state 
Unlike Scandinavian or Central European states, Turkey’s application for membership of 
the European Union is understood in Turkey as  ‘Westernisation’.  Its purpose is to 
strengthen the creation of the modern, territorial, secular and Jacobin republic envisaged 
by Ataturk.  Turkish leaders describe EU membership as a further stage in securing  
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Western recognition of their equal standing, as founder member of the UN, full member 
of NATO and of the Council of Europe, Associate of Western European Union. Unlike, 
say, France, Turkish leaders do not distinguish sharply between Americanization and 
Europeanization.  In contrast to the Greek emphasis on their cultural identification as the 
fount of democracy and European civilization, Turks do not stress their European 
heritage as the location of Roman, early Christian and Byzantine artefacts. They prefer to 
recall that, where Britain and France categorized Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, 
American pressure secured Turkish membership of NATO, linked to SACEUR, the 
American Supreme Allied Commander Europe. American pressure similarly helped 
reverse the Luxembourg Council’s rejection of Turkey’s EU candidature, and overcome 
the Greek and Swedish opposition expressed at the Cologne summit of 1999, the summit 
before Helsinki.  
As the purpose of membership is to strengthen the state, it follows that a great deal of 
the Turkish opposition to membership focuses on those aspects of Europeanization that 
might undermine the ability of the state to enforce its authority against what Charles de 
Gaulle in the French context called ‘les éléments de dispersion’.  Military leaders are not 
alone in fearing that European demands for civilian control will undermine the capacity 
of the National Security Council to act decisively against Islamic and Kurdish threats to 
the secular and indivisible state. The EU demand that political parties be allowed greater 
freedom of expression carries with it the real possibility that a Kurdish party will promote 
the secession of South East Turkey, and that an Islamic party will promote distancing 
from European secular norms. The decisions of the Strasbourg European Court of Human 
Rights within Turkey have been particularly salient in Turkey. The long-running civil 
war, and the long-standing identification of judiciary and the police with state repression 
of dissent, have provided plenty of cases. A second reason is that the acceptance of extra-
territorial judicial oversight took place over a long period in Western Europe and has 
been more sudden in Turkey. The Loizidou verdict, finding that Turkey was the 
occupying power in Northern Cyprus and therefore responsible for compensating Greek 
Cypriots for loss of rights and psychological harm, was widely interpreted in Turkey as a 
political case making a settlement with the Greek Cypriots more difficult.  On the other 
side are those who think that it is in Turkey’s interest to reform its political and judicial  
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system for its own sake, to make Turkey the kind of republic to which Kurdish and 
Islamist parties could choose to be loyal. 
Cyprus has become a national issue for Turkey. At one end of the spectrum are those 
who consider that Turkey would be stronger if the Cyprus dispute ceased to be a thorn 
poisoning relations with Greece, complicating all its international relations, and 
burdening the budget with the costs of troop deployment and corrupting subsidies to the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) budget.  At the other end of the spectrum 
are the more public expressions of a stance which denies the legitimacy of the Greek 
Cypriot government, and regards the costs of supporting the TRNC as cheap in protecting 
Turkey’s existing borders and in protecting the 200,000 Turks and Turkish Cypriots in 
Cyprus.  Prime Minister Ecevit frequently claims that he brought peace to Cyprus in 
1974; Foreign Minister  İsmail Cem’s rapprochement with Greek Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou has so far not been extended to the Cyprus and Aegean issues 
(Turkish Daily News, 14 December 1999). 
In terms of kith and kin, President Denktash of Northern Cyprus has been able to 
make claims quite unlike those of the Bulgarian or Thracian Turkish minorities.  In 1999 
he defended his claim that the TRNC constitutes a state,  
   
Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus have established a state. It cannot be a nation-state, 
because there is no Turkish Cypriot nation. A Turkish Cypriot is the extension of 
Turkey in Cyprus. So we are Turks, of Cyprus.... We are Turks, as Turks of 
Anatolia are; but because our geography is Cyprus, we are Turkish Cypriots. If you 
were to organize Turkey on a geographical basis you would call a Turk from 
Erzerum an ‘Erzerum Turk’ (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 2002: 183). 
 
The logic of equating Cyprus Turks with Erzerum Turks is that, as happened with Hatay, 
the TRNC could decide in a referendum to become a province of Turkey.  Proud of being 
Anatolian, the electorally popular President of the TRNC is unconcerned that national 
officials from Turkey have authority in every ministry of the independent Turkish 
Cypriot state.  The Turkish forces and the Turkish Cypriot troops, the fire brigade and the 
police, are all commanded by Turkish nationals; (just as in the internationally recognized 
Republic of Cyprus, the National Guard and the Greek troops have commanders from the 
Greek mainland).  Again Mr Denktash does not insist that he be treated on his frequent  
     
 
    8 
     
visits to the only country that recognizes the TRNC with the protocol due to a foreign 
head of state.   
On the other hand, his Turkish patriotism may have been decisive in keeping a public 
silence when Prime Minister Tansu Ç iller decided that it was in Turkey’s national interest 
in March 1995 to complete the Customs Union with the EU, knowing the price exacted 
by Greece on Cyprus.  Moreover many Turkish Cypriots do not share this sense of total 
identification with Anatolia. While the programme of the political party which regularly 
receives the most votes in Northern Cyprus, the UBP, agrees that the “ Turkish Cypriot 
people are an indivisible part of the Turkish nation” , the opposition CTP wants to 
preserve the Turkish Cypriot community against immigrants from places like Erzerum.  
Its political programme states that “ the inflow of foreigners prevents the shaping of a 
Turkish Cypriot will and threatens their existence”  (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 
2002: 187). Whatever their birthplace, most Turkish Cypriots want to retain their 
dominance in the North, with a Turkish presence. Hence the widespread objection to 
being categorized as a minority, and now officially to being categorized as a community.  
Forty years have passed since Turkish Cypriots dealt with their Greek Cypriot 
compatriots as neighbours.  They fear rule by a Greek Cypriot majority; they fear that 
free movement for individuals and groups would lead to confrontations fuelled by 
property claims and hatred.   
A final point on Turkish identification with Northern Cypriots as a national issue is 
more ideological.  In 1974, Kemalists of all political parties supported the  ‘Peace 
operation’ in Cyprus. They did not object to the partition of Cyprus on the grounds that 
Ataturk had denied any Turkish responsibility for the welfare of Turks outside the 
frontiers claimed in 1923.  There was more unease in 1983 when Mr Denktash formally 
seceded from the Republic of Cyprus by establishing the TRNC when the new civilian 
administration of Mr Özal was still weak, and the support of the Turkish ambassador was 
doubtful.  But some Kemalists might well oppose nationalist opinion if the issue was the 
integration of Northern Cyprus into Turkey as a riposte to the accession of the Republic 
of Cyprus to the European Union.  Faced with the end of the EU membership process and 
of the Customs Union, some Kemalists might suggest that it was inconsistent to oppose 
Kurdish secession, ‘peace at home’, while promoting secession in Cyprus, endangering  
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‘peace abroad’. This links to the second aspect of Cyprus as a national issue, the threat to 
the existing frontiers of Turkey posed by a united Cyprus under Greek majority rule. 
 
Military interests 
Turkey and Greece are the only European countries in NATO to have increased their 
arms expenditure since the end of the Cold War.  This is partly to compensate for the 
phasing out of American military assistance, and partly to meet the costs of suppressing 
the Kurdish PKK. The main justification for the huge re-equipment programme 
envisaged to 2025 is the increased volatility of Turkey’s many neighbours since 1989. 
Turkey is the leading actor in a regional security complex, defined as “ a set of states 
whose major security perceptions and concerns are so inter-linked that their national 
security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another”   
(Buzan et al. 1998: 12). Moreover, most Turks respect the Turkish army as the guarantor 
both of the secular state and its borders because, despite the armed forces’ huge 
commercial interests, they regard officers as incorruptible. The General Staff’s 
assessment of military requirements is rarely questioned, inside or outside the Grand 
National Assembly.   
Since 1974, the Turkish army has maintained the 3:1 superiority which in pre-
helicopter days was judged necessary to defend an island.  As the Greek Cypriot National 
Guard and Greek contingent on Cyprus amount to 10,000 men, Turkey has deployed 
numbers fluctuating between 30,000 and 35,000 men. (Lindley 1999: 201).  Given 
Turkey’s large runways in the North of Cyprus, its command of the air in conjunction 
with Israel, its helicopters and landing craft, and its parity with the Greek navy, the 
Turkish General Staff might accept that it could reinforce a smaller contingent on Cyprus. 
The Greek mainland is 500 miles distant. What it could not accept is that a Greek Cypriot 
state could use those same runways to threaten Turkey’s air or sea communications, or 
enable Greece to blockade the Turkish ports of Mersin, 40 miles distant, and Iskenderun, 
the oil route to Ceyhan from which it exports Iraqi oil and hopes to export Caspian oil, or 
Israel. To Turkey this perceived threat is aggravated by the two-front aspect of preparing 
for a conflict in the Aegean. This aspect would be less serious if the Greek Aegean 
islands, militarized by Greece after their 1974 experience, were demilitarized, perhaps in  
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response to the reduction of the Turkish Aegean army.  The gap between Turkish and 
Greek military strength has increased.  Greek doctrines of ‘extended deterrence’ and the 
coupling of its defence with that of Cyprus through the Joint Defence Doctrine are not 
enough to maintain the credibility required for Greece to deter Turkey by military power. 
It is most interesting that the Turkish army agreed that it could postpone some of its 
projected expenditure as a contribution to showing the IMF that the Government’s 
budgetary deficit could be reduced, an unusually frank acknowledgement of the 
connection between government expenditure and inflation. 
 
Economic issues 
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has also experienced a banking crisis, 
requiring additional subsidies from the mainland and controls imposed on expenditure. A 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute would enable tourists to be flown directly to the 
unspoiled North, bringing with it foreign investment in infrastructure. The concomitant 
risks seen from the Turkish perspective are that Turkish Cypriots will be bought out by 
the richer Greek Cypriots, or even that Turkish Cypriots who want to sell will be 
physically attacked by those who fear Southern domination.  These risks could be 
reduced if the local administration could control sales through licensing, as the Swedish-
speaking Åland islanders are entitled to do under the terms of Finland’s accession treaty 
with the European Union. 
For Turkey itself one of the main attractions of EU membership would also be an 
inflow of foreign investment.  A study by Loewendahl et al in 2000 found that capital 
flows into Turkey “ have rarely reached $1billion in any year, a quarter of the figure for 
Poland” , a less populous country.  Turkey’s geographic location, potential home demand, 
and membership of the Customs Union are favourable to foreign investment. The quality 
of Turkey’s young, educated labour force ranks above all 47 competing countries in the 
study.  Turkey’s failure to attract anything like the investment in Poland is only partly 
explicable by its governmental and monetary instability, and an administrative tradition 
hostile to foreign ownership. These drawbacks apply also to a lesser extent to Poland. 
The single most important difference is that Poland is assured of early membership in the 
EU, offering more assurance to mobile capital of a stable political and economic future.   
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Turkish access to the European market is at risk from the European sanctions that would 
be applied if Turkey fulfils its threat to integrate Northern Cyprus, which would be 
depicted by Greece and the Republic of Cyprus as a change of frontiers without the 
consent of all interested parties. 
On the other side of the argument, it can be said that membership of the Customs 
Union has so far meant a trade deficit and a loss of government revenue from higher 
tariffs. Continued participation is not justified unless it leads to full EU membership with 
access for agricultural production and an equal say in the making of future European 
rules.  Turkey, like Japan, is big enough to remain an independent sovereign state, and its 
nationalists are willing to pay the political and economic costs of going it alone. 
 
III.  EU interests in Turkey becoming a Member State  
 
Lacking an elected government, the European interest is whatever the Member States can 
agree on – ideally on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, perhaps now also 
with input from the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee  – and the 
subsequent assent of the European Parliament. The institutions, most Member States, and 
public opinion have been unenthusiastic both about the accession of Cyprus without a 
settlement and the accession of Turkey.  The official line of the European Commission is 
that a settlement in Cyprus is a matter for the communities under the aegis of the UN 
Secretary-General; and that it is up to Turkey to reform itself to the point where the 
Member States can authorize the Commission to begin accession negotiations.  The 
linkages between Cyprus accession, to be finalized this December, a settlement, and a 
date for opening accession negotiations are shrouded in obscurity.  You have to read 
Paragraphs 4, 9 and 12 of the Helsinki Conclusions in conjunction with a hint last 
November in Nicosia by Commissioner President Romano Prodi that the EU might 
overlook its principles of free movement if there were a settlement on Cyprus. 
What is missing from the Commission Opinions on Cyprus and Turkey is any strong 
sense that it is in Europe’s interest to create peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Peace 
between France and Germany had to be created on the basis of equality. The island of 
Cyprus would be more prosperous, and an example of peace instead of conflict, if the two  
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communities could be united in observing European Union directives on the basis that 
they are united by geography.  Greece and Turkey could be equals in the European 
Union, united by geography despite their cultural and policy differences.  Just as France 
took the risk of substituting a ‘good neighbour’ policy for ‘no appeasement of Germany’, 
so Greece has reason to prefer Turkey as a good neighbour instead of refusing all 
appeasement of a country in illegal occupation of part of an Hellenic island.  
The second European interest in having Turkish Cyprus and Turkey included in the 
Union has to do with changes in Europe’s composition and self-image since 1950.  It is 
no longer possible to teach the European idea as built on the heritage of Rome, Jerusalem 
and Athens, or as the secular successor of Christendom. There are probably more than 12 
million Muslim residents and citizens within the territories of the EU15. Yet if their 
present lack of proportionate representation in the political and administrative institutions 
of the nation-states is bad enough, they are even less well represented at the European 
level.  No Muslims attend any meetings of the European Council or the Councils of 
Ministers. There are no Muslim Commissioners, and few Muslims are employed by the 
European Commission. There is one Muslim member of the European Parliament. 
Turkish membership might not be welcome to P akistani, or Moroccan, or Kurdish 
communities in the EU15, but the presence of a secular Islamic state, and of a self-ruling 
Islamic community, in the EU would go some way to making a multicultural Europe 
more visibly a reality.  
Thirdly, the European Union is not just a community of merchants but also now a 
community of human rights. The European Court of Justice is closely if still incoherently 
linked to the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights. The decisions to 
include Spain, Portugal and Greece were not based on European economic interests or 
military advantage.  The leaders of France and Germany went against the most articulate 
interest groups in their respective countries to finance and promote what might be called 
milieu interests in having democratic and peaceful neighbours. A sense of cultural 
identity seems to have been less important, although the fact that Giscard d’Estaing and 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher were Hellenophiles probably influenced the Council’s decision 
to override the Commission’s negative Opinion on Greece.  Today, the quickest and most 
effective way to secure human rights and civilian democracy in Turkey would be, as it  
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was in Greece and Spain, through early EU membership, not first requiring a period of 
good behaviour.  A  date for opening accession talks would help those in Turkey 
campaigning for reforms. 
 
IV.  Conclusion  
 
On this view of Turkish and European interests in a Cyprus settlement, the failure of talks 
between Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash might be followed by an international conference 
called by the European Union summit at Copenhagen this December.  If Turkey chose to 
participate, the EU and Turkey together could invite the Turkish Cypriots on the same 
basis as the Palestinian leadership were invited to the Oslo  process and to the Camp 
David talks.  According to Ian Brownlie,  “ State practice shows that no recognition is 
implied from … presence at an international conference at which the unrecognized entity 
participates”  (Brownlie 1990: 96). If successful, the proposals would be submitted to 
popular referenda on both sides of the Green Line.  It may be that this conference will be 
unsuccessful, in which case the accession of the Republic of Cyprus will be followed by 
an ice age of uncertain length between the EU and  Turkey, even though the Turkish 
language, by virtue of its status in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, will 
become an official language of the European Union. 
On a more hopeful note, I append a proposal for joint rule in Cyprus under EU law 
modelled on the only agreement ever concluded between the Palestinians and Israelis, the 
1995 Yossi Beilin/Abu Mazen framework agreement for joint rule in Jerusalem. The 
democratic communitarian basis suggested implies concessions of principle from both 
Cypriot communities and the international community. As European law would prevail, 
elected councillors would, like American mayors, have more executive than legislative 
functions. Greek Cypriots might agree that the policing of the North, the development or 
not of central institutions, and the conduct of foreign policy will be primarily a matter for 
those elected by Turkish Cypriots.  Turkish Cypriots might agree that the Greek Cypriots 
are entitled to the Presidency, to the control of the Central Bank and the majority of 
central ministries, and to a reduction of Turkish influence.  The European Union might 
agree that its principles of free movement have to be subject in the Turkish Cypriot zone  
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to the requirements of peaceful order as defined by the elected provincial authority; the 
UK might, as with the retained sites, accept leasehold instead of sovereign rights over its 
two base areas as its contribution to the geographical reunification of the whole of 
Cyprus.  
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Appendix 
 
DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR CYPRUS 
 
With a view to the early accession of a united Cyprus to the European Union, the 
elected Presidents of the two major communities agree that the following terms be 
put to their electorates as a compromise settlement of their dispute on how the 
island shall be governed. 
 
MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
•  Each of the two sides acknowledges the moral and material harm caused to the 
people of the other side in the past. Greek and Turkish Cypriots commit 
themselves to act with goodwill in seeking reconciliation in the future. 
 
TERRITORY 
•  The island of Cyprus will be a federal state, comprising two autonomous 
provinces. The Southern Province shall comprise fifteen districts; the Northern 
Province shall comprise five districts.  
•  The British sovereign base areas will become part of the sovereign territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus, leased to Britain for 49 years.   
•  The zonal boundary follows the line of the old railway from Famagusta to 
Nicosia. From Nicosia westwards, the division through Morphou reduces the 
Northern zone to 28% of the whole island (the British bases to be included in the 
Southern zone). 
 
PROPERTY 
•  Each Provincial Authority shall be responsible for generously and speedily 
compensating residents of its own zone who can prove that their loss of property 
in the other zone has not yet been adequately compensated.   
•  The European Union will provide financing for half the sums that are agreed by 
the parties as fair compensation for either moral or material loss, or both.  
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•  Individuals who choose to refuse compensation for the material loss component 
due to them shall retain title to their property, but the future exercise of their 
rights shall be subject to the requirements of public order as determined by the 
Authority in each zone.  
 
GOVERNMENT  
•  The Central Council will be composed of one representative (and one alternate if 
the representative cannot be present) from each district  i.e. a small Executive 
directly elected by the districts rather than having indirect elections from two 
Assemblies 
•  The Council shall elect the  President  i.e. a Greek Cypriot for the foreseeable 
future 
•  The President shall appoint ministers from members of the Council.  The minister 
responsible for foreign policy must be a Turkish Cypriot.  The President, with the 
agreement of at least three Turkish Cypriot members of the Council, shall appoint 
the Governor of the Central Bank. Other ministers would have responsibility for 
water supplies, civil aviation, telecommunications, electricity services, 
archaeological sites and any other matters agreed by a  majority defined as 
including at least three Turkish Cypriot members.   
•  The work of the Central Council will be financed by a proportion of receipts from 
Value Added Tax as set by a majority including at least three Turkish Cypriot 
members.   
•  Elections by citizens of Cyprus resident in the districts of each zone shall 
determine the composition of each Provincial Authority, responsible for local 
taxation, local services, police and gendarmes (limited to side-arms), transport, 
education, housing, planning, and immigration.  
•  Troops from other Member States of the European Union will be stationed in 
Cyprus by agreement with the President of Cyprus, who may request their 
assistance if he judges that there is a situation of civil disorder.  
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•  The Turkish Cypriot Provincial Authority may authorize Turkey to station up to 
5,000 men in the vicinity of one designated airfield.  Additionally, for an 
emergency period of six months, the Provincial Authority may authorize Turkey 
to deploy such troops as Turkey deems necessary in any of the five Turkish 
Cypriot districts. 
 
NICOSIA 
•  The Municipality of Nicosia will be unified. 
•  An elected sub-municipality of fifteen Greek Cypriot boroughs will be 
responsible for local services. 
•  An elected sub-municipality of five Turkish Cypriot boroughs will be responsible 
for local services. 
•  A Joint Higher Municipal Council will be composed of one representative (and 
one alternate) from each of the fifteen Greek Cypriot and five Turkish Cypriot 
boroughs.  
•  The Joint Higher Municipal Council will elect the Mayor by majority.  In setting a 
municipal rate for central services, the majority must include at least three 
Turkish Cypriots. 
•  The Mayor will appoint from among the representatives councillors responsible 
for such central services as may be agreed.   
•  In all matters relating to the Turkish Cypriot area of the Municipality of Nicosia, 
the Municipal Council shall obtain the consent of the Turkish Cypriot Provincial 
Authority.  
•  In all matters relating to the Greek Cypriot area of the Municipality of Nicosia, 
the Municipal Council shall obtain the consent of the Greek Cypriot zonal 
authority.  
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HOLY PLACES 
•  Holy places will be managed by the religious authorities to which they belong. 
The Central Council may grant the Greek Cypriot Provincial Authority 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the St Andreas monastery in Karpas provided that 
it grants the Turkish Cypriot Provincial Authority extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
the Tekke of Umm Haram in Larnaca. 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
•  European law will obtain in Cyprus. The Treaty of Accession will provide that the 
freedom of movement of persons, goods, capital and labour may be subject in 
each zone to such licensing by the Provincial Authority as it deems necessary for 
the maintenance of public order. The treaty could specify that the public order 
exception allowed in the treaty of Rome be a matter for the provincial authorities 
in Cyprus. 
•  The Euro will be the currency of Cyprus. 
 
REFERENDA 
•  Two referenda will be held simultaneously in both zones of Cyprus on the 
question, “ Do you wish that Cyprus unified on the terms set out in this agreement 
accede to the European Union?”   A majority in both zones is required. 
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